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Abstract 
In Indian philosophy, a pramāṇa is an epistemic instrument or doxastic practice that results in a 
veridical cognition (in an event of knowing). For just about all Indian thinkers, perception 
(pratyakṣa) and inference (anumāna) are the foundational pramāṇas, although they debated 
energetically over how to characterize the content of the resultant cognitions and how to explain 
the basis for the authority of these pramāṇas. Debate also includes the relationship of knowledge 
to religious liberation, the role of scripture in knowing, and the possibility of omniscience. 
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Main Text 
In Indian philosophy, a pramāṇa is an epistemic instrument or doxastic practice that results in a 
veridical cognition: an agent’s knowing-event. As knowing is an action, pramāṇa-theorists 
employ an analytical framework that identifies contributors (kārakas) to actions—a framework 
due to Sanskrit grammatical theory. A knowing action (pramiti or pramā) thus has an agent 
(pramātṛ), an object (prameya), and an instrument (pramāṇa). Pramāṇa-theory inquiry proceeds 
along these structural lines.  
There is individuation of pramāṇas in virtue of their nature qua instrument—as it is the 
tool, not object or agent, which determines an action’s nature (one cuts wood with an axe and 
paints it with a brush). The most frequently discussed candidate pramāṇas are perception, 
inference, testimony, analogy, postulation, and cognition of absences. For nearly all Indian 
thinkers, perception (pratyakṣa) and inference (anumāna) are foundational pramāṇas, though 
Cārvāka <EOPR0068> accepts only perception. Buddhists <EOPR0063> and Vaiśeṣikas 
<EOPR0401> usually consider testimony as reducible to inference, not an independent pramāṇa. 
As for analogy, Mīmāṃsakas (Prābhākara and Bhāṭṭa), with Advaita Vedāntins <EOPR0405> 
and Naiyāyikas <EOPR0274> accept it as sui generis. But Naiyāyikas depart from these 
traditions in understanding postulation—the positing of some unperceived entity to resolve 
something otherwise incongruent or subject to doubt—as reducible to inference. Finally, only 
Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas and Advaita Vedāntins accept direct cognition of absences. Jaina thinkers 
 
 
have different lists of pramāṇas, which only partially overlap with the above: perception, 
testimony, yogic perception, telepathy, and omniscience (see < EOPR0187>). 
There is also debate about the property in virtue of which which pramāṇas are effective 
as instruments—about, that is, the basis for their status as “being pramāṇas” (prāmāṇya). In this 
regard, there are two principal positions: pramāṇas are knowledge-conducive either intrinsically 
(svataḥ), or extrinsically (parataḥ). On the first view, an agent who has a pramāṇa-caused 
knowledge-event need not be in a position to ascertain external evidence about that event's nature  
in order for it to count as knowledge. On the second view, agents do not count as “knowing” 
without reference to a further awareness to the effect that the first cognition was indeed a 
knowledge-event. 
There is discussion of the conditions—relative to agent, instrument, and object—that give 
rise to the action of knowing. ‘Pramāṇa’ is a success term, including only genuine epistemic 
instruments. Thus philosophers distinguish between “pseudo” knowledge events and genuine 
ones based on appropriate conditions, which may include phenomenological considerations 
along with external features and the structure of cognition.  
 Many discussions involving pramāṇa directly bear on religious topics. For instance, 
thinkers in the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā <EOPR0243> tradition argue that testimonial knowledge, 
an important pramāṇa in both ordinary and religious contexts, is reducible to inference, though 
they clarify that this only applies to ordinary speakers, and not to the Veda <EOPR0404>. For 
Mīmāṃsakas, the Veda is authorless, lacking any “speaker,” whether divine or human. Its 
testimony thus cannot be a matter of inference, which in ordinary linguistic testimony is to the 
truth of an utterance on the basis of a speaker’s authority and trustworthiness (see 
<EOPR0338>). 
 Faultlines over controversial pramāṇas relevant to religious knowledge cut across 
boundaries of traditions. Brahminical philosophers such as Mīmāṃsakas align with materialist 
and skeptical Cārvākas in denying that yogic awareness <EOPR0423> is a pramāṇa leading to 
knowledge of supernatural states of affairs (such as reality’s nature and dharma). Although many 
Indian thinkers (both Buddhists and Hindus) defend yogic perception, Mīmāṃsakas argue that to 
attribute such powers to ordinary people is unreasonable, and, too, yogic perception is used to 
justify a range of mutually incommensurable views (McCrea 2009). They instead ground Vedic 
authority in the apparently eternal chain of communal textual transmission, which lacks any 
epistemically vulnerable initial revelatory breakthrough (divine or human). 
 Debate also occurs over the limitations of pramāṇas for religious knowledge, as when the 
Advaita Vedāntin Śaṅkara paradoxically claims that the effect of a pramāṇa is to cause the 
person qua knowing agent to cease, once they have achieved the highest level of knowledge. For 
Advaitins, who elevate knowledge above ritual action as a means to liberation (mokṣa), the 
ultimate unity of everything in the absolute reality of brahman precludes any real distinction 
between knowers and objects of knowledge. This apparent tension in Advaita epistemology 
garners attention, both within Vedānta and from opponents outside of the tradition (see 
EOPR0178; EOPR0213; EOPR0214). 
 Buddhist thinkers also closely link religious emancipation (nirvāṇa) with knowledge, 
emphasizing connections between pramāṇa-based insight into reality’s nature—refined by 
meditative practices—and attaining the proper viewpoint on the (non-existent) self. In his 
reduction of all other putative pramāṇas to perception and inference, the seminal 5th-century CE 
thinker, Dignāga <EOPR0104>, distinguishes between particulars (svalakṣaṇa) known by 
perception, and universals (sāmānyalakṣaṇa) known by inference. Only perception grasps 
 
 
ultimately real particulars, which are momentary and unique. Any subsequent conceptualization 
(e.g., “I see a red apple”) has unreal universals as its content. Dignāga’s student, Dharmakīrti 
<EOPR0101>, along other with later Buddhists such as Śāntarakṣita <EOPR0351> and 
Kāmalaśila <EOPR0200>, attempts to explain how, despite these limitations, certain persons can 
directly grasp the ultimately real by yogic perception, in a manner freed from conceptualization 
through meditative habituation (McClintock 2010). The Buddha is a paramount example of such 
a knower, sometimes characterized as being a pramāṇa himself. The distinction between real 
particulars and unreal universals is also relevant to Buddhist scripture, insofar as scriptural 
testimony is a form of inference—with unreal universals for content. 
 Jaina philosophers, who argue that reality admits of apparently contradictory 
predications, claim that it is possible to attain omniscence, at which point one can directly 
apprehend reality (see <EOPR0281>). Traditionally, founders of Jainism did just this, and their 
scriptural testimony is useful for others who seek to be liberated. However, scriptural testimony 
and perception are still indirect means of knowledge. Further, ordinary knowledge is always 
attained and evaluated from a particular standpoint (naya). Analytically speaking, our statements 
about the world should thus be prefixed with the logical operator syāt (“perhaps”), which 
relativizes them contextually. Kundakunda (3rd century CE) and later Jainas identify seven 
hierarchically-ordered types of syāt-statements (see <EOPR0017>). 
 Modern Indian philosophy, especially the Indo-analytic tradition tracing from B.K. 
Matilal, finds significant points of contact between classical Indian epistemology outlined above 
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